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Abstract—In today’s corporate world, the notion of corporate
governance has taken a more important role in the management
of large corporates. There is a growing consensus that large
corporates ought to take more of a stewardship approach to
running a company in a clear attempt to move away from the
agency theory approach, with all its attendant problems and
issues. A fundamental component of corporate governance con-
cerns the adequate recognition of risk faced by the organisation
and dealing with it appropriately. Traditional corporate IT risk
is well understood, as are the mitigation strategies needed to
address this important area. Large corporates also understand
risk theory well, and how finding the right balance between
risk and profitability is key to ensuring profitability can be
maximised while ensuring long term sustainability and resilience
are also achieved. We assert that the cloud computing paradigm,
while economically attractive to corporates, provides such a
step change from traditional IT paradigms, that new risks have
evolved, which are not well understood, leading to the possibility
of unintended exposure to these sometimes considerable risks.
We propose a different approach to the quantification of these
risks, which we believe will provide a more robust approach to
understanding the potential exposure they face when using cloud.
Index Terms—Corporate governance; corporate stewardship;
risk appetite; cloud security risk.
I. INTRODUCTION
Achieving effective information security in the cloud is not
a trivial process. There are many challenges to overcome, and
sometimes those challenges arise from the most unexpected
places. There are a great many influences, which bear down
on the successful outcome of meeting this important goal, and
often, a number of these influencing factors are not aligned.
This presents managers with something of a paradox when
it comes to satisfying all the demands placed upon them,
particularly when it comes to satisfying the rules of good
corporate governance, managing risk effectively and balancing
this with the primary goal of a company, which is to maximise
the resources of that company for the benefit of the share-
holders. This fiduciary responsibility of management to the
shareholders has been a fundamental tenet of good corporate
management for a very long time.
However, there is also a recognition that a company needs
to be managed responsibly in a sustainable way to ensure the
continued existence of the company, such that it be capable of
withstanding sudden market shock, in other words is resilient
to market forces, and added to this is the requirement to act
in a responsible, accountable and ethical manner.
A modern requirement of a company is that there is now
a recognition that information forms a key element of the
resources of that company, and that it is therefore necessary to
safeguard this information properly. This is further reinforced
following the introduction of, sometimes punitive legislation
[1][2], to ensure that companies achieve this goal.
For those member states of the EU, and for the UK post
Brexit, there is a new “Bogey man” on the horizon — the
forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation, which is
scheduled to be brought into law in May 2018. This will
require a considerable number of changes to be implemented
in corporate systems in order to comply with this legislation.
The level of fines proposed takes compliance fines to a new
high, and will definitely attract the attention of board members.
In Section II, we discuss some background on all these
issues. In Section III, we consider how the Financial Services
Sector approach cyber risk, in Section IV, we consider why
this might be important for company cloud users. In Sec-
tion VI, we consider how this might work; and in Section VII,
we discuss our conclusions.
In the next section, we will take a look at these important
areas to see what we can learn.
II. BACKGROUND
We start by looking at Corporate Governance, followed by
Risk Appetite, IT Risk and Cloud Security. This first area we
look at will be Corporate Governance.
A. Corporate Governance Literature
We can trace some of these issues back to the early 1930s,
when Berle and Means [3], commented how setting up a
large company was now beyond the means of any single
person, which would lead to the popularity of the large
company, where we would see the concept of the separation
of management and ownership. This, in turn, would ultimately
lead to the evolution of Agency Theory [4]. One of the
fundamental flaws of Agency Theory is the inability to control
greed, and this became one of the fundamental weaknesses of
this theory, leading to the uncontrolled growth of management
remuneration.
In the UK, the financial de-regulation, which took place
in the 1980s, would lead to extremes of corporate financial
excess, including corporate scandals, such as the Bank of
Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), Maxwell and the
controversy over directors’ pay. Government responded to
this by commissioning the 1992 Cadbury Report [5]. This
resulted in the introduction of the “Combined Code”, to
which all large UK corporates should adhere, by reporting
in their annual return whether they “comply or explain” with
the recommendations of the report. A year later, Jensen [6],
wrote about the effect of technological innovation and internal
control systems failures. Jensen and Chew [7] investigate the
effects of the takeover boom of the 1980s. The Combined
Code was subsequently updated [8]–[11].
Still in the UK, UK corporate governance continues to
evolve with incremental but increasing awareness of corpo-
rate responsibilities to more than just shareholders and also
a widening recognition of risk and societal impact — all
relevant to cloud security. One recent example of this wider
trend would be the Modern Slavery Act (2015) requiring an
annual statement with a home page link explaining the steps
the company has taken to expose and take out slavery in
their supply chain [12]. This has some relevance as minor
web breaches probably are not consequential to shareholders
especially if not disclosed, in a similar way slavery is probably
even advantageous — perhaps we are slowly moving away
from shareholder dominance.
In the US, after the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX) in 2002 [1], Bauer et al [13], Bratton [14], Brickey [15],
Holmstrom [16], Mitchell [17] and Rosen [18] all wrote about
the implications for corporate governance. In the UK, Higgs
[19], updated the Combined Code, and the effects of SOX were
also addressed for the Financial Reporting Council [20]. The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) [21] published its principles of corporate governance.
Further updates to the code took place [22]–[25], and the
next significant change occurred in 2012, when the Financial
Reporting Council (FRC) recommended a new Stewardship
Code be adopted [26].
It is worth pointing out that there is a fundamental difference
between the approach adopted by the UK and the US. The UK
have adopted a principles based approach, whereby general
principles are established, and companies are required to
“comply or explain” in their annual report. This means there
is little need to constantly change legislation to keep up. By
contrast, the US have adopted a rules based regime, whereby
very specific legislation is enacted to determine what corpo-
rates must do. While the goals and requirements are generally
clear, it has spawned a high-end legal and accounting industry,
which constantly seeks to probe and push the boundaries in
order to gain advantage, while retaining the ability to achieve
compliance. Thus, the US government must constantly rewrite
and update the rules to keep pace with these continuous
attempts to subvert the rules — a considerable ongoing task.
Regulators too, will have a more challenging task to keep
on top of all these attempts to subvert the rules. Duncan
and Whittington [27] provide some useful background on this
area, including corporate legislation and standards compliance
issues.
The clear and evolving message to come through from all
these changes is that there is now a much greater emphasis
on the need to identify and address risk properly. The global
financial crash of 2008 really brought home the importance
of effective risk management. Banks, in particular, had been
“going through the motions” rather than really paying attention
to the possibility that some of these risks were very real, and
the consequences of failing to address them properly would
have a catastrophic impact on not just their own business, but
the global economy as a whole. It is also the case that financial
regulators were themselves pretty much caught asleep on the
job. Thus, we will next look at risk appetite.
B. Risk Appetite
Risk appetite can be described as the amount and type
of risk that an organisation is willing to take in order to
meet their strategic objectives. Risk needs first to be properly
identified, and the consequent financial implications properly
measured or estimated should the risk identified arise. The
probability of occurrence of each risk identified, must also be
calculated. Such identified risks must then either be accepted,
mitigated against, or declined, depending on the risk appetite
of management. Usually, there is a correlation between risk
and reward. The more profit that can be generated, usually
the greater the risk the organisation is exposed to. Often, this
risk considerably exceeds the potential amount of profit to be
generated.
All companies generally have developed a mission state-
ment, or vision statement. Where financial goals or targets are
identified, it will be necessary to identify the risk requiring to
be taken to achieve such goals and targets. This identifies the
minimum required risk that must be taken in order to meet
the goals or targets. If the risk required is unrealistic, i.e., too
high, then the goals or targets should be adjusted, otherwise
this will automatically lead the company to accept dangerous
levels of risk.
In any event, the risk capacity of the company must be
identified, as must the risk tolerance. These are not the same
thing. Risk capacity tries to identify the extent to which
the investment strategy can withstand negative events without
seriously affecting the achievement of the goals or targets
of the company. Whereas risk tolerance considers the extent
to which a company is willing to risk a less favourable
outcome in pursuit of a possible greater outcome. This can
be considered a psychological trait, and if company managers
happen to have have a high tendency towards the psychopathic
spectrum of behaviour, there is a greater chance of a mismatch
arising between risk capacity and risk tolerance, leading to
a less well considered attitude towards the real risk being
undertaken [28].
This leads management to seek an economic equilibrium be-
tween profit and risk, such that they can maximise profit con-
strained by their understanding of risk. Where the company is
run by prudent management, they will usually decide to accept
those risks, which they understand really well, mitigate risks,
which they are prepared to accept, but where they mitigate the
extent of the risk accepted, possibly by the use of insurance,
to minimise their exposure, and decline all risk they do not
understand. This will usually lead to a safe performance, if
somewhat unexciting. Duncan and Whittington [29], argued
that where the management approach to running the company
is biased towards the traditional agency based management
approach, rather than a stewardship approach, the company is
likely to have a higher risk appetite. Successful use of this high
risk approach can lead to complacency over time, resulting
in a more cavalier assessment of risk within the company,
which can ultimately lead to hubris developing, leading to
the acceptance of much higher risk levels than have been
understood. When this approach goes wrong, the results can
be catastrophic [30].
Risk culture in a company evolves from a system of values
and behaviours present in that company, which will shape the
risk decisions of management and employees. An important
element of risk culture is the development of a common
understanding of a company and its business purpose or aims.
C. IT Risk
In large corporates, the area of IT risk in traditional dis-
tributed systems is generally very well understood. There
are some very good security standards, such as the joint
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (ISO/IEC),
ISO/IEC 27000 [31], Control Objectives for Information and
Related Technologies (COBIT) [32], and the Payment Card
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) [33], which are
well adopted by large corporates. Indeed, by 2012 [34], some
two thirds of FTSE100 companies were either fully or partially
compliant with the ISO/IEC 27000 series of security standards.
While this is a laudable approach, it must be considered that
compliance alone will not guarantee security [27].
The attack community are continually developing and ex-
ploiting new vulnerabilities, and thus a stringent and robust
approach to system monitoring must be in place. There is
little point in having a certificate to show compliance, if the
company fails to detect a breach. Many breaches are not picked
up until some time later. The risk emanating from this can turn
out to be expensive. Recently, ASUS settled for $400,000 after
they were sued by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) [35],
because they were not providing updates for their insecure
routers. The new EU General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) will come into force in May 2018. It will increase this
(monetary) problem for companies with a maximum monetary
penalty of up to 4% of global turnover.
D. Cloud Security
Often, companies will seek to prove they have achieved
security through assurance. This assurance is usually achieved
by compliance with standards, or by audit. However, one of
the difficulties with cloud computing is that there are over 30
standards bodies who have been working on cloud security
standards, and we are yet to see a fully comprehensive cloud
security standard evolve [27]. There are difficulties too, with
the method of compliance audit undertaken [36], which can
have a considerable impact on the effectiveness of the audit
exercise.
The fact that we have no complete cloud security standard
is a major issue, meaning large corporates might be missing
the potential to identify the increased risk arising from running
their own software on the cloud. In the multi-tenancy, multi
layer, environment of cloud computing, many forget that the
solid corporate firewall they have so carefully developed for
their corporate distributed systems does not extend to the cloud
environment.
There is much we can learn from the approach taken by
one of the most exposed market sectors to cyber risk — the
financial services sector. This market sector is a prime target
for cyber attacks. Liquid cash, particularly in electronic form is
much easier to attack than large physical objects. Thus, in the
next Section, we consider the approach taken to evaluating
cyber risk in the financial services sector. These risks are
well understood, and the risk models developed are now very
advanced, and highly accurate.
III. CYBER RISK IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR
Cyber risk has attracted increasing awareness for financial
risk management in recent years. Financial intermediaries such
as banks, investment companies, and insurance companies are
the prime targets for cyber crimes. Figure 1 shows the average
cost of cyber crimes incurred by companies of a specific
industry, started from financial services, energy and utilities,
and followed by defence and aerospace, and technology. The
financial service sector has undergone a tremendous techno-
logical transformation, resulted from the adoption of digital
banking, Financial Technology (FinTech), mobile applications,
cloud computing, etc.
A. Cyber Risk in Financial Risk Management
It is of great importance to quantify cyber risk for finan-
cial risk management. Four types of risk - credit, liquidity,
market, and operational — can affect the potential outcome /
performance of financial investments for companies. Value at
Risk (VaR) is a popular approach among modelling techniques
used by financial institutions to quantify the market risk of
investment. However, the model can not foresee a ‘black
swan event’, a low-probability occurrence with high-value
impact. Cyber VaR can be used to model the cyber risk, with
consideration for cyber black swan events. A cyber VaR model
can be used to estimate the likely loss of an organisation in the
event of cyber attacks during a time period. The components
of the VaR framework consist of the existing vulnerabilities of
Fig. 1. AVERAGE ANNUAL COMPANY COSTS OF CYBERCRIME IN
$MILLIONS
a system, the maturity of defending the system, the frequency
of successful breaches, the tangible and intangible assets
of the company, the types of attachers and their attacking
motivations, etc. The adoption of cyber VaR can be helpful
for a company to quantify the potential loss of a cyber attack.
B. Crypto-Currency in the Financial Sector
Crypto-currency, which is a form of virtual currency that
uses crypography for security, may present increasing threat
that negatively impact the cyber security of finance. Based
on new applications of information technology, these virtual
currencies attempt to remove money and banking from the
control of sovereign governments, and they represent one of
the most disruptive innovations ever in consumer finance.
The underlying distributed ledger technology has many other
potential applications in diverse areas such as property reg-
istration, accounting and auditing, gambling and financial
derivatives.
The potential threat of this emerging technology motivates
a better understanding of crypto-currency. It has essentially
resulted from a technical experiment, with no monetary value.
It has grown to an industry with more than 510 crypto-
currencies with market value of $5.5 billion, composed of
bitcoins. Although crypto-currencies have the advantage of
higher efficiency and transparency for conducting transactions,
reducing banking fees and bringing technological innovation to
the financial industry, they are also used by cyber-criminals as
they are not connected to any central banks and not regulated
in many countries.
In the next Section, we explain why this model could be
relevant to corporate cloud users.
IV. WHY IS THIS RELEVANT TO CORPORATE CLOUD
USERS?
In order to properly identify what risk is in the case of
using cloud computing, users should first start with their prior
evaluation of IT risk in regard to their existing distributed non-
cloud setup. Since they will have been running these systems
for a very long time, it is likely that the risks will be well
understood. However, where a company assumes that because
they understand these existing risks well, they will be well
able to handle cloud risk, they will be placing themselves in
considerable danger.
However, once they make the decision to move to cloud,
simply moving software systems across to the cloud and
assuming all past risks will continue as they have traditionally
been identified, is a fallacy, and could lead them into a false
sense of security. IT risk does not equal cloud risk. Any cloud
ecosystem is far more complex than a traditional distributed IT
system, and there are far more actors in the cloud ecosystem,
meaning it is far more difficult to ensure a proper lavel of
security can be achieved.
Many modern companies present an attractive target and
will be subject to a raft of attacks, from a variety of different
sources. These attacks will come from state sponsored actors,
industrial espionage, hacktivists, specialist criminal gangs, and
talented amateurs.
State sponsored actors will be exceptionally well resourced,
will be very highly skilled, with the capability to breach
systems, and leaving a minimal footprint. They are extremely
hard to detect, and difficult to protect against, but may only
be interested in keeping an eye on what the company is up
to, in order to provide their government with the means to
understand how other countries are progress in what may be
a competitive market for their country. Thus, stealing cash is
not likely to be high on their priority list.
Those who perpetrate industrial espionage generally have a
view to getting their hands on new technology, either to sell
to a rival, or to simply sell on the black market. They will
generally be well skilled, independently well resourced from
past espionage activities, and highly persistent. While that may
have a long term impact on the company, they are less likely
to be looking to steal cash.
Hacktivists are often very skilled, highly motivated towards
their cause, although less well resourced than the previous
groups. They usually are not concerned with stealing cash,
but are concerned with exposing perceived wrongdoing by
the target company. They are primarily motivated to cause
maximum embarrassment, sometimes will seek to disrupt
physical systems to highlight their cause, but generally are
not interested in staling cash. Where they disrupt systems, the
knock on damage could be substantial.
Specialist criminal gangs can range from well resourced
and well skilled groups, down to small scale criminals, who
will often “rent an attack” from the dark web. The primary
goal of these groups is to steal cash, or to obtain intelligence,
which will enable them to steal the cash at a later time. They
tend to be very resourceful, highly skilled at social engineering
attacks, and can often buy in the attack tools they require from
the dark web.
The amateur group can range from very talented amateurs
down to complete amateurs just trying to breach large systems
in order to boast about it. The really talented ones are much
harder to catch. While they can be very skilled, and have
limitless patience and time to spend on the attacks, they often
are poorly resourced, which can inhibit their activities. The
complete amateurs can be problematic from the damage they
sometimes cause as they try to get into systems, or after
they get there. The majority are not after cash, but the really
talented ones can cause a huge amount of disruption.
So, with all these different actors constantly trying to get
into company systems, why is the financial services sector of
interest to cloud users? It is simply the fact that they have
been targets of attack for a very long time, due to the very
liquid nature of their business. Over the past decades, they
have become very skilled in developing risk attack models to
evaluate the risks they face, and are getting really good at it.
Equally, large companies often invest cash surpluses to
maximise revenue production while they accumulate cash in
preparation for their next expansion pus, thus in the process
becoming greater targets. The attack actors have become adept
at gathering a wide range of business intelligence in addition
to learning how to analyse and understand financial statements,
thus are able to pick better targets to attack.
Thus, companies must learn how best to evaluate properly
they very real risks they face. In the next section, we consider
how they might go about achieving this.
V. FINDING THE BALANCE
Risk is a fundamental part of any company. The main goal
of any company is to maximise the generation of profit in a
sustainable way. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary
to define what the target return will need to be. This provides
the risk requirement needing to be accepted in order to achieve
the desired outcome.
Assuming this risk requirement to be both practical and
achievable, the management of the company will then evaluate
all the risks in order to understand what they are taking
on, not just to achieve the goals of the corporation, but to
satisfy the requirements and obligations incumbent upon them,
such as compliance with legislation, regulation, standards, best
practice and accepted ethical standards of doing business.
Enterprises need to be sustainable in the long run and resilient
to shock. Each of these requirements can cause a conflicting
pull on company management to ensure the best outcome can
be achieved.
Not all risks must be taken by a company. Rather, they need
to evaluate which risks to accept, which to mitigate, and which
to decline, in order that they can satisfy all the requirements
placed upon them. Clearly, some level of compromise will
need to be made in order to find a suitable balance.
The best approach for achieving this balance is first to
understand fully the extent of each risk, and to assess properly
whether they are prepared, or need to accept each risk. By
identifying those they must accept, if they understand the risk
properly, they will be better placed to evaluate whether each
risk should be accepted in full, in part, or rejected.
The use of a good evaluation model will provide a better
means of achieving this goal more easily. This is why we
suggest adopting the financial services VaR model on IT risk
as a foundation for adapting it to also cover cloud risk.
VI. HOW WILL IT WORK?
The application of cyber VaR would be of help to estab-
lish the minimum standard on covering the limits and risk
assessment of cyber security. Based on the literature [37][38],
the current challenge of quantifying and validating cyber VaR
is the lack of quality data. Another shortcoming of the VaR
measure is that it can be ‘useless’ for small probabilities with
a significant outcome event. In finance literature, the Monte
Carlo simulation and other measures have been proposed to
tackle this. To address the impact / size of the outcome, the
tail event or extreme event is defined as the largest percentage
of losses measured relative to the respective VaR. Thus,
the extreme event for cyber risk can be considered for risk
management of cyber security.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated how traditional and well understood
approaches to IT security risk do not work well with trying
to identify and evaluate cloud cyber risk. We have highlighted
how cloud risks differ from traditional distributed systems,
and illustrated weaknesses in existing approaches. We have
looked at how cyber risk is tackled in the financial services
sector, and suggest how adapting the proposed cyber risk VaR
model might help to improve cloud cyber risk assessment, thus
helping companies to find a better balance between risk and
reward.
We note that the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) and the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) have
both introduced new updated approaches to cloud cyber risk.
These and other national organisations are co-operating more
with the ISO, who have produced a number of risk standards,
such as ISO 31000 on corporate risk, ISO/IEC 27005 on
information security risk management. We propose to review
how their approach has been updated and will seek to discover
whether any of these changes might be implemented into our
system.
We are in the process of agreeing a plan to carry out a
pilot development of this proposed system, and to compare its
performance against existing approaches to evaluate how well
it performs, with a view to providing the means of assessing
the best level of risk awareness that is possible.
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